Introduction
The wage premium for higher education has been well studied for all developed countries and various determinants have been investigated to explain the development in the past decades. In the United Kingdom (UK) there has been a dierent development of the wage patterns than in other European countries where wage inequality existed but was rather constant. Similar to the U.S. and Canada the wage premium and returns to education increased dramatically in the 1970s and the 1980s (Leuven et al., 2004; Harmon and Walker, 1999; Card and DiNardo, 2002) and for many authors the driving force of this development is skill-biased technological change (SBTC) (Haskel and Slaughter, 2002; Levy and Murnane, 2006) . SBTC is the shift in the demand from low to high-skilled workers induced by technological progress. The increasing eciency of high-skilled labour and the decreasing demand for low-skilled workers tend to result in higher wages for the high-skilled and decreasing or at least stagnating wages for the low-skilled. For the U.S., Bartel and Sicherman (1999) show that there is strong relationship between wages and technological change in the 1980s and early 1990s. They suggest that the education wage premium in technology-intensive industries can be associated with an increase in the demand for higher educated workers with higher ability. They conclude that variation within the group of higher educated workers with respect to ability has increased. In compliance with these ndings, Galor and Moav (2000) developed a growth model in which wage inequality is induced by ability-biased rather than skill-biased technological change. In this model, technological change is responsible for an increase of the demand for high ability. They argue that heterogeneity in skills exists not only between skill groups but also within skill groups which leads to more wage inequality. More recently, a study by Marquis et al. (2011) tries to shed light on the causes of wage inequality in the U.S. in a vintage capital model, showing that technological change is only a minor determinant of wage inequality in the U.S. They suggest that factors such as lack of job-related training at the low end of the skill distribution and increased human capital at the high end of the skill distribution may be driving forces of shifts in the skill distribution, leading to more wage inequality.
However, recent ndings for the UK show stagnating education premia. Following Silles (2007) , the returns to education did not increase since the 1990s. Purcell et al. (2005) nd even decreasing skill premia in the 1990s that arose from higher supply of high skilled workers, among other factors. That would mean that the demand of high skilled workers is saturated by the higher supply so that premia stagnate or even decrease.
In fact, since the beginning of the 1990s, the number of university students increased sharply due to at least two facts: First, the general expansion of the educational system and intensive economic growth which induced young individuals to obtain higher degrees with the aim to earn higher wages in the future and second, the Further and Higher Education Act from 1992. By this act, the polytechnics and colleges that focused on applied education for work and oered credentials that were lower ranked than those from standard universities were changed to`New Universities'. Thus, the act created a higher supply of university educated workers. It is questionable if the increase in supply of graduates has led to more heterogeneity in qualications and other human capital related factors, such as ability, among graduates and if this inuenced the education-wage pattern. In other words, is there a hidden increase in wage inequality which is only discovered when looking at certain industries?
To investigate this hypothesis and shed more light on the complex wage patterns in the UK, this study estimates the personal innovation wage premium using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the years 1991 to 2006 and industry level data from the OECD Statistical data base. The study focuses explicitly on the development of wage inequality over time rather than in levels in dierent manufacturing industries taking into account the heterogeneity of innovative activity within the manufacturing sector. As innovative activity related data, such as the amount of R&D expenditure and the number of patent applications, is mostly only available and meaningful for the manufacturing sector this study focuses on manufacturing industries. Both, the SBTC hypothesis and the ability-bias technological change (ABTC) hypothesis will be tested. The SBTC hypothesis will be tested directly using time interactions in the regression models. Employing several panel data estimation techniques, such as Random eects, Fixed eects, and Mundlak and
Hausman-Taylor models, to account for dierent sources of ability-bias allows to indirectly test the ABTC hypothesis.
The contributive features of the study to the existing literature are the following. On the one hand, this is the rst study for the UK, which combines data from the BHPS and industry level data on input and output related factors of innovative activity to investigate skill-biased and ability-biased technological change. It is an extension of the study by Bartel and Sicherman (1999) , who investigated the`technological change premium' in the U.S., in at least two respects. First, it uses additional panel estimation models which allow controlling for both individual and industryspecic ability and reduces biases in the estimated premia. Second, by adding time variables to the model it is possible to investigate changes over time and hence, to identify the eects of technological change explicitly. Another new aspect of this study is that it empirically tests the ABTC hypothesis modelled by Galor and Moav (2000) which has not been done so far. The intention of the study is to shed some light on the complicated relationship between technological change and the demand for higher educated workers in times when the number of university graduates has almost doubled within 20 years and reached more than 50% in 2006.
The results show that the graduation wage premium has been high but constant (approximately 30%) during the investigated period according to all estimation methods which may be due to the increased supply of graduates. The personal innovation wage premium however increased signicantly by up to 25 percentage points, revealing that the demand for graduates has been higher in innovative industries than in non-innovative industries. This supports the SBTC hypothesis. The eect is found using both indicators for innovative activity. The coecients of innovative activity measured by R&D expenditure for higher educated workers are smaller when it is controlled for industry-specic and individual ability, indicating that the coecients are upward biased in the pooled OLS and that the demand for high ability in innovative industries increased. This supports the ABTC hypothesis. Using patent applications as a measure does not support the latter hypothesis though.
The ndings have important implications for the future development of wage inequality in the UK. One is that wage inequality between high-and low-educated workers will increase given that demand for graduates in innovative industries increases, i.e. if SBTC continues. The other implication is that wage inequality within the group of high-educated workers will further increase if the number of graduates further increases. The higher number of graduates increases heterogeneity among graduates and reduces the signal of high ability implied by a university degree. The results also relate to the ndings about over-education among graduates in the UK (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Chevalier, 2000; Chevalier and Lindley, 2009 ) and the discussion about increasing tuition fees. Hence, the results also contribute to the recent policy debate about public spending on further and higher education.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents recent literature on SBTC and ABTC. Section 3 elaborates theoretically the role of innovative activity in the determination of wages and wage dierentials. Section 4 explains the estimation methods and the data are described in Section 5. The main empirical results and implications are presented and discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Related literature
While the literature on skill-biased technological change (SBTC) is large and characterised by an ambiguity about the existence and the measurement of SBTC, the strand of the literature that is concerned with ability-biased technological change (ABTC) is rather small, at last because of the complication of measuring the eect of ability on wages and because it is a relatively new topic. In the following, the literature on SBTC change will be summarised and the most inuential ndings will be discussed. Subsequently, studies concerned with ABTC will be reviewed to setup the framework for the study at hand. Note that the terms technological change and innovation will be used interchangeably.
In the late 1970s and 1980s there has been the so-called computer revolution in the UK that changed long-run patterns of income distribution. The wages for high skilled workers increased and the wages for low skilled workers decreased. Many authors have found these wage premia especially in innovative industries or rms which exhibit high levels of technological change (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Autor et al., 1998; Haskel and Slaughter, 2002; Levy and Murnane, 2006) . Innovative industries are characterised by technological progress, the use of specic IT equipment, the implementation of research and development and a high number of patent applications. In consequence, highly qualied workers are needed to meet the high demands because higher educated workers are known to have a comparative advantage with respect to the adoption and the implication of new technologies (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987) .
Evidence for SBTC has been found in the 1970s and 1980s. Numerous micro-and macroeconomic studies document the statistical correlation of using new technology and the shift in the level of high skilled employment (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987, e.g.) on the one hand and the income distribution (Autor et al., 1998, e.g.) on the other hand. Economic theory and evidence of SBTC is provided by Acemoglu (2002) who models endogenous SBTC, Aghion (2002) who proves Schumpeterian growth theory in relation to wage inequalities and Katz and Murphy (1992) who examine the eect of SBTC on wage dierentials in 1992 for the U.S., taking into consideration the uctuating supply for college graduates between 1963 and 1987. Another study that is taking into account the wage dierential and skill-biased technological change is the recent work of Corsini (2008) , who estimates a xed eects model for European countries using (among others) the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s but does not look at changes over time. In the rst part of the paper Corsini investigates the correlation of SBTC and wage dierentials. He measures the intensity of technological change by R&D expenditure data. The intention is that the higher the rate of R&D expenditures is relative to national GDP, the more intensive the technological progress is in an economy. Corsini (2008) states that SBTC is the driving force of the wage dierentials. His interpretation of the result is that skilled workers are more able to adapt to the change of technology and take advantages in periods when technological process is very intensive. Card and DiNardo (2002) provide evidence for the college vs. high school wage gap for the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s in reference to SBTC. They argue that the rise in wage inequality was an episodic event in the U.S. A recent study by Marquis et al. (2011) tries to shed light on the causes of wage inequality in the U.S. in a vintage capital model. In this model, it can be shown how technological change aects labour demand. They report that technological transition accounts for only 1/20th of the observed increase in wage inequality in the U.S. They suggest that factors such as lack of job-related training at the low end of the skill distribution and increased human capital at the high end of the skill distribution may be more important in the determination of shifts in the skill distribution which then lead to more wage inequality.
Recent ndings for the UK also suggest a decline in the wage premium (Silles, 2007; Purcell et al., 2005) . Silles (2007) calculates the returns to education for men and women with data from the British General Household Panel (GHP) for the years 1985 to 2003. She computes the returns to years of education using OLS and nds that the returns for men increased slightly over the whole period and the returns for women even declined. With pooled OLS she nds returns to education of 5.7% for men and 8.7% for women 1 . Purcell et al. (2005) postulate that the skill premium has been declining in England. They investigate the education-wage relationship for two graduate cohorts (1995 and 1999) and suggest that at least one reason is the increasing amount of high educated graduates since the 1990s. Taber (2001) oers an empirical study in which he argues that high college premia in the US in the 1980s are upward biased due to unobserved ability and that the demand for high ability has been increasing. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the number of university students increased sharply due to at least two facts: First, the general expansion of the educational system and intensive economic growth which induced young individuals to obtain higher degrees with the aim to earn higher wages in the future and second, the Further and Higher Education Act from 1992. By this act, the polytechnics and colleges that focused on applied education for work and oered credentials that were lower ranked than those from standard universities were changed to`New Universities'. Thus, the act created higher supply of university educated workers. Presumably, the increase in supply of graduates has led to more heterogeneity in qualications and other human capital related factors, such as ability, among graduates. Bartel and Sicherman (1999) argue that high-ability high-educated workers sort into industries which are characterised by a high level of technological change. They investigate the education wage premium using individual level data for the U.S. and merge it with industry level data on technological change. As they explicitly look at levels of wage dierentials, they are neither able to identify skillbiased nor ability-biased technological change.
The literature on ability-biased technological change is rather scarce but builds on the insights given by studies on skill-biased technological change. Galor and Moav (2000) proposed an economic growth model which suggests that wage inequality exists both between skill groups and within skill groups due to higher variation in ability within the groups of high-educated workers. They suggest that technological change increases the returns to ability and thereby accelerates wage inequality. Andersson et al. (2009) and Stern (2004) explicitly look at the wage premium for scientists.
They argue that the relationship between wages and science is characterised by an ability bias and that innovative sectors pay more for high ability.
Finally, the measurement of SBTC and especially ABTC is hampered by the limited availability of appropriate data. Most studies are based on rm or industry data (Bratti and Matteucci, 2005; Haskel and Slaughter, 2002; Dunne et al., 2004; Corsini, 2008) which lacks individual worker characteristics. Only few studies such as Bartel and Sicherman (1999) , Stern (2004) and Andersson et al. (2009) are based on individual panel data. Similar to Bartel and Sicherman (1999) this study uses individual panel data and merge industry level data to control for personal, rm and industry characteristics.
Theoretical background
In presenting the theoretical background of the determination of wages, a formulation similar to that of Taber (2001) and Griliches (1979) is used. A simple version of the wage equation without subscripts for individuals for the sake of simplicity can be written as
where w is the wage rate, Edu is the level of education which can either be high (Edu = hedu) or low (Edu = ledu). The variable θ 1 is an unobserved eect which determines the wage rate and the level of education simultaneously, i.e. education is endogenous. θ 1 is a placeholder for all kinds of unobserved characteristics, such as innate ability, managerial skills, ambition or assertiveness. The literature on the returns to education is mainly concerned with unobserved ability which is correlated with the wage rate and the obtained educational level. It is assumed that more able individuals are more likely to stay in school longer and obtain higher degrees (Card, 1999) . In the following, θ 1 is named individual ability, but it is left to the interpretation of the reader whether the eect is indeed ability or other related unobservable characteristics that are correlated with both education and the wage rate.
The commonly found wage dierential between graduates and less educated workers is dened by
i.e. the dierential can be decomposed into the dierence in returns to education (β hedu−βledu) and the dierence in the returns to ability ( μ 1 > 0) with the induced ability bias
Hence, an increase in the wage dierential is the eect of (a) an increase in the return to education, (b) an increase in the return to unobserved ability or (c) an increase in the ability dierential between graduates and lower educated workers.
A large strand of the literature has found higher wage dierentials between workers of dierent educational or skill levels in rms or industries which exhibit certain features such as large rm size or multinationality. For example, Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) provide evidence for a positive rm size-wage relationship. Girma et al. (2001) and Taylor and Drield (2005) show that foreign direct investment increases wage inequality. Borjas and Ramey (1995) show that rising wage inequality can be explained by trade-intensity and Bartel and Sicherman (1999) suggest that technological change induces greater wage dierences between high and low skilled workers. Most of these attributes such as technological change, intense patent application behaviour and large investments in R&D, are indicators for the extent of innovative activity of a rm or industry. To account for dierences in innovative activity among the industries in which the individuals are employed, the variable Inn = inn 1 , inn 2 , ..., inn ∞ is added to the above model. Furthermore, it is assumed that there is industry-specic ability, denoted θ 2 which is unobservable:
This equation includes the wage dierential between dierent educational levels, dierent levels of ability and the ability bias as in equation (2) and the wage differential between dierent rates of innovative activity (γinn1 − γinn2), the wage dierential between dierence in returns to industry-specic ability (μ 2 > 0) and the industry-specic ability bias and can be written as
This unobservable industry-specic eect is by assumption a typical random eect that is uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables (as in (Bartel and Sicherman, 1999) ).
2 This industry-specic ability could for example be some kind of visual creativity required in the software industry.
Certain jobs require certain skills and abilities. Jobs which are related to innovative activity are likely to require certain skills, such as logical thinking and mathematical knowledge, which allow the possessor the adaption and invention of new technology. A few studies have suggested that positive wage eects of innovative activity are attributed to higher education and advanced skills because high-educated workers are more able to adapt to new technology more easily than less educated workers (Bartel and Sicherman, 1999; Andersson et al., 2009; Stern, 2004) . This eect is introduced by the eect of innovative activity, conditional on a high level of education. A third unobservable eect is then plausible to determine the wage rate which is`innovation ability ' (θ 3 ) which is correlated with innovative activity and education. Equation (3) expands to
Innovation ability is assumed to be the ability to invent or develop a new product which is likely to be specic to high education. This does not imply that low educated workers cannot have good ideas for a new product or the improvement of an existing product. Rather the implementation is more likely to be pursued by a higher ranked, normally higher educated, co-worker who consequently will receive the wage gain from the original idea.
An increase in the wage dierential between high and less educated workers can now be due to the concepts (a), (b), (c) explained above, or due to (d) an increase in the return to high education attributed to innovative activity (δ), (e) an increase in the return to innovation ability (μ 3 ) or (f) an increase in the innovation ability bias. Furthermore, the equation implies that the group of university graduates is dierentiable into those with higher ability and those with lower ability.
The hypothesis is that not only education is associated with the adoption and invention of new technology but also innate ability. A high level of ability enables a worker to adapt to new technology more easily than with a low level of ability and hence, makes him more productive. If this is the case, those individuals should receive higher wages, imposing a wage dierential between high-educated individuals with low ability and high-educated individuals with high ability. This hypothesis is based on recent ndings on the development of wage dierentials in the UK. While increasing wage dierentials have been found in the 1970s and 1980s in the UK, more recent studies on wage dierentials have found stagnating wage dierentials between educational levels (Silles, 2007; Purcell et al., 2005) . Presumably, the steadily increasing number of university graduates is responsible for this change. A plausible assumption is that it is unlikely that the additional number of individuals who attended universities in the recent past are equally well endowed with innate ability as the former smaller number of university students. This means that heterogeneity with respect to ability increased within the group of university graduates and a university degree in itself cannot serve as a signal of high ability anymore. As a consequence, those university graduates with lower ability will sort into low paid jobs while highly able graduates sort into higher paid jobs where other skills than those obtained at university are equally or even more important.
In line with these considerations is the hypothesis of skill-biased technological change. If the wage dierential between graduates and less educated workers is increasing over time and is correlated with innovative activity, this suggests that skill-biased technological change exists. Furthermore, if there is an (additional) increasing premium for workers with high ability associated with innovative activity, this implies that ability-biased technological change is present. The investigation of these hypotheses requires the investigation of wage patterns over time. This is done by adding time variables (T ) to equations (3) and (5). The next section explains this procedure in more detail and elaborately describes the estimation methods used.
Estimation techniques
The static relationship between innovative activity of the employing industry and individual wages can be estimated as formulated in equation (3). Adding subscripts for individual i, working in industry j at time t and additional individual controls, such as socio-economic and workplace characteristics summarised in X and an overall constant α, (3) becomes
with θ 1 and θ 2 being time-invariant and λ represents the coecient vector of X. Accordingly, equation (5) becomes
where θ 3 is also time-invariant. Estimating the equations using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) will result in ecient but biased estimates. The coecient on the education variable (β) will be upward biased because it is endogenous (it is correlated with unobservable ability θ 1 ). Moreover, the coecient on the interaction term between innovative activity and education will be upward biased due to endogeneity (it is correlated with unobservable`innovation ability' θ 3 ). The solution to this kind of bias would be the estimation of a Fixed eects (FE) model in which all variables are time-demeaned. By time-demeaning, the unobserved time-invariant eects, such as ability, drop out of the regression equation and the estimation gives unbiased results of the endogenous regressors. However, the variable on education also drops out because it is time-invariant by denition 3 . In the rst part of the study in which the static relationship is estimated other estimation methods are necessary.
A method that is able to account for the bias that results from industry-specic ability (θ 2 ) is the Random eects model (RE). Under the estimation of a RE model the individual specic eects are assumed to be i.i.d. which is assumed for θ 2 . The coecients in the RE model are estimated via Generalised Least Squares (GLS) and is consistent and ecient given the correlation between the individual eects and the explanatory variables imply no correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term. As pointed out before, θ 1 and θ 3 are correlated with the explanatory variables education and the interaction term which induces correlation between the error term and these regressors. Hence, the RE model can solve the problem of industry-specic eects but cannot account for the individual-specic ability-bias.
Furthermore, a Hausman test suggests that a FE model is appropriate.
One solution is the method proposed by Mundlak (1978) . He proposed to estimate a RE model which allows for correlation between the explanatory variables and the individual xed eects because the individual eects are a linear combination of the time averages of all the explanatory variables such that
and
whereX is a vector of all time-demeaned explanatory variables and u is the i.i.d.
disturbance term. Practically, this means estimating equation (6) and (7) including π 1Xij and π 3Xij . As the Mundlak model (MU) also accounts for industry-specic unobserved eects because it uses the GLS estimator, it gives estimators which are unbiased and more consistent and ecient than the OLS and RE estimates.
Another possibility to account for individual correlated eects in panel data is the approach proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) . The Hausman- Taylor (HT) model makes an explicit distinction between exogenous and endogenous explanatory variables. Adopting this distinction, the presented model can be written as
where X 1 is a vector of time varying exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with the individual unobserved eects, variables and includes Inn. X 2 is a vector of time varying variables which can be correlated with the error term, for example (Inn|Edu = hedu). Z 1 is a vector of time-invariant regressors which are uncorrelated with the unobserved eects and Z 2 is a vector of time-invariant endogenous regressors, such as Edu. ν is the remaining idiosyncratic error term. The HT model is an instrumental variable model with the advantage that it does not require model-external instruments. These are usually dicult to nd because they underlie strong assumptions. The model uses X 1 and Z 1 as their own instruments, uses deviation from the mean of X 2 (X 2 −X 2 ) as instruments for X 2 , and Z 2 is instrumented by the individual means of X 1 , namelÿ X 1 . The model is identied as long as there are at least as many time-varying exogenous regressors as time-invariant endogenous regressors. The model is based on the random eects transformation, i.e. the HT instrumental variable estimator is a GLS estimator. As mentioned before, the GLS estimator is consistent and ecient if all regressors are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error term ν and only a subset of regressors is correlated with the unobservable xed eects (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) . The HT approach usually leads to very high coecients of education variables. Hence, the interpretation on the education coecients will be made carefully, if at all.
Furthermore, this study is less concerned with the level of wage dierentials but more with the development of wage dierentials over time. To allow the coecients to vary over time, time period dummy variables are included in the model and multiplied with the education variable, the variable which measures innovative activity and the interaction term of both. This step enables to explicitly test the SBTC hypothesis. If the wage dierential between graduates and less educated workers has increased over time and if the dierential is associated with higher levels of innovative activity, i.e. if there is a personal innovation premium, this suggests that SBTC has been prevalent. Moreover, if the coecients resulting from the models in which it is possible to account for individual time-invariant unobserved eects are lower than the coecients from models where the coecients on education are likely to be upward-biased, this indicates that ability is driving the large wage premia for graduates in innovative industries and that there is a sorting of highly educated and highly able individuals into innovative industries. This would support the ability-biased technological change hypothesis.
Data
This study uses the rst sixteen waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) from 1991 to 2006. The BHPS is a nationally representative random sample of about 5,500 British households, containing approximately 10,000 interviewed individuals. The survey provides a rich source of socioeconomic information on household and individual level (Taylor et al., 2007) . For the presented investigation it contains the required data on educational attainment of individuals, their income and the industry aliation of their job classied at national Standard Industrial Classication (SIC 80/SIC 92), as well as a large number of personal socio-economic and job characteristics. The investigation is restricted to the manufacturing industry as data that relates to innovative activity is mainly available for the manufacturing sector and is also mostly reasonable in this sector.
Industry level data, i.e. the amount of R&D expenditure, the number of patent application and the value of production output, is extracted from the OECD StatsExtract website 4 , where industries are classied at the International Standard Industrial Classication (ISIC 2 and 3.1). All four classications are standardised to one classication which resulted in 8 two-digit industries (see Table 3 in the Appendix). The remaining manufacturing industries are (1) Food, Beverages and Tobacco, (2) Textiles and Leather, (3) Wood, Paper, Publishing, (4) Chemicals, Coal, Plastics, (5) Non-metallic Minerals, (6) Basic Metals, (7) Machinery and Equipment and (8) Other Manufacturing industries. The information on patent applications based on the International Patent Classication (IPC) has also been made consistent with the developed classication.
The sample used 5 is an unbalanced panel of male and female workers aged 20 to 64. Only individuals that are salaried in the private sector and are not self-employed are included. The nal sample contains about 14,000 person-year-observations over 16 years (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) .
The dependent variable is log real hourly wage. It is calculated using usual gross pay per month (a derived variable that measures usual monthly wage or salary payment before tax and other deductions in current main job for employees) divided by usual standard weekly hours. Wages are then deated by the consumer price index (CPI) to the base year 1991. Graduates are those who obtained a university degree, measured by a dummy variable. Figure 1 represents the development of the relative supply of graduates between 1991 and 2006 in the sample. Production output, patent applications and the amount of R&D expenditure per industry are divided by the number of employees in the respective industry, i.e. the industry levels of the indicator variables are per employee values. All monetary indicators are deated using the same index as for deating wages. The innovation indicators R&D expenditure and patent applications and also production output which serves as a control variable, are plotted in Figure 2 . It can be seen that only two industries have high R&D expenditures and only two apply for patents regularly. Figure 4 shows the correlation between graduates' hourly wages and innovative activity which is positive for both indicators. Furthermore, Figures 5 and 6 show the development of average wages in industries which are innovative, meaning they have a high level of R&D expenditure and a high level of patent applications, respectively. A high level of a certain activity means that the activity is greater than the average in the whole manufacturing sector. It can be seen that according to both indicators the mean wages are higher if the level of innovative activity is high. Also, wage growth is higher. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table A1 
Results

Levels
The results are presented in two dierent tables, one for each of the innovation indicators, including the OLS, RE, Mundlak and Hausman-Taylor results. Separate tables for the xed eects results are presented and discussed later as they are not directly comparable with the other estimation results. We start looking at the impact of R&D investments per employee in levels. Table 1 shows the eect of R&D expenditure on wages for graduates and less educated workers combined and then separately when the interaction term of R&D expenditure and the education variable is included. In all regressions the indicator variables measure the semi-elasticity between wages and innovative activity.
According to the OLS results, higher education, i.e. having a university degree, is rewarded with a wage premium of 21% which is statistically signicant at the 1% level. The graduation premium is even higher when controlling for unobserved eects: the RE model estimates a premium of 32%, Mundlak 31% and Hausman-Taylor 63%. A much higher premium resulting from the HT model has been found as well by Hausman and Taylor (1981) and should be interpreted with care. Interestingly, all other estimated coecients, even those which are endogenous, do not dier to the coecients estimated with the other models. The coecient of R&D expenditure is 20% in the OLS regression model, 14% in the RE model and 10% in the Mundlak and HT models. A coecient of 0.21 implies that an increase in R&D expenditure per employee per year in average industries by 10,000 GBP leads to an increase of the average wage of all workers by 21%. Seeing that the whole manufacturing sector spends on average 2,060 GBP per employee per year on R&D between 1991 and 2006, this impact can be considered being large. When the interaction term between R&D expenditure and graduation is included, the base R&D expenditure regressor, which now measures only the eect of R&D expenditure on less educated workers, drops by 2 percentage points in all estimation models. The base education coecient drops even more in all models. The interaction term measures the eect of an increase in R&D expenditure for graduates only and thus estimates the wage premium dierential for additional R&D expenditure the personal innovation wage premium between graduates and less educated workers. It is 27% according to OLS, 18% in the RE model, and 20% and 21% in the Mundlak and HT models, respectively. The results suggest, that graduates prot much more from R&D expenditure than less educated workers. Furthermore, controlling for industry-specic ability and individual-specic ability lowers the interaction term by 7%-points and raises the graduation coecient signicantly. This suggests that OLS results for the eect of R&D expenditure for graduated workers are upward biased due to ability, implying a sorting process of high-ability high-educated workers into jobs or industries which are R&D intensive.
As Bartel and Sicherman (1999) have mentioned, R&D expenditure is an input related factor for technological change, while the use of patents is an output related factor. In their study, they nd a higher impact of input related factors of technological change on wages than of output related factors. The measure of patents in the presented investigation is the amount of patent applications per employee. A measure of patent applications compared to patent use as in Bartel and Sicherman (1999) is a more precise measure of innovative activity because it covers more inventions of a new product or process rather than the grants of patents only 7 . Still, the here used measure of patent applications can also be considered as an output based factor of technological change and is a measure of innovative activity. Table A2 shows that the correlation coecient between R&D and patent applications is rather small (18.9%) but signicant. As there is a correlation between all the indicators and production output, all regression equations include production output as an additional regressor. The eect of patent applications on wages in levels is documented in Table 2 . When the interaction term is not included the coecients are very similar to the R&D results. The premium for being higher educated is almost exactly the same as in the table above. The coecient for patent applications is 23% according to the pooled OLS regression. This means that an increase in patent applications by 0.01 per employee per year increases the average hourly wage by 23%. In other words, applying for one more patent per year increases a worker's wage on average by 0.23%. This is also an mentionable eect, as the manufacturing sector applied for about 1 patents per year per 1000 employees between 1991 and 2005. The inclusion of the interaction term of patent applications and graduation also changes the coecients of the base regressors in a similar way as the inclusion of the R&D expenditure interaction term does. The coecients of the interaction term are large and highly signicant. However, the coecient of the interaction term itself is higher, between 22% and 26%, when controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity, than in the OLS regression (18%). This implies that the application of patents is less correlated or even negatively correlated with ability than R&D expenditure, but still suggests the favour of higher education in the relation to innovative activity.
Changes over time
The previous results have shown that there is a signicant and large personal innovation premium for all workers averaged over the period [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . The concern of this study is to look at the development of the personal innovation premium over time to allow inference to be made about skill-biased and ability-biased technological change. Therefore time period dummies are included in the regressions and multiplied with the eects of interest, i.e. the innovation indicator, the education variable and their interaction term. and * * * denote signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 18 regional dummies, 9 occupational and 15 year dummies included. Charcatersitics inlcude prodiction output by industry, a female dummy, tenure tenure squared, two rmsize dummies, a dummy for union membership, a dummy for being married, having kids, self-rated healh and three age dummies. Table 3 shows the estimated coecients for the innovation indicator R&D expenditure. The OLS results are very dierent to those from the other models: Without the interaction term, the eect of higher R&D expenditure on wages is decreasing over time and the graduation premium is more or less constant over time. In the other models, R&D expenditure rst jumps from being small in the rst period (insignicant in Mundlak and HT model) and then drops continually but stays large in the end (between 9% and 12% in 2003 to 2006) and is statistically signicant.
When including the interaction term multiplied with the time period dummies the base R&D expenditure coecients stay the same in size in all but the last period, where it is smaller of about 2 to 4 percentage points, depending on the model. The base graduation regressors shrink in the OLS model through including the interaction term but stay the same in the other models. Only in the last period, the higher education premium is much smaller than in the regression without the interaction term. To summarise, the inclusion of interaction terms in the regressions reduces the coecients of the base variables only in the last period, which is puzzling at rst sight. This puzzle can be explained by looking at the coecients of the interaction terms. In all three models which control for unobserved eects the interaction term increases from a negative but insignicant value in the rst period to a positive but insignicant value in the third period and is large and signicant in the last period.
This suggests that graduates did not gain from innovative activity in the 1990's but do signicantly in the new millennium. This is strong evidence for skill-biased technological change. Additionally, both industry-specic ability and individual ability seem to be rewarded more with higher R&D expenditure. The results show an ability bias in the R&D expenditure-graduation variable, as the coecients in the models which control for unobserved ability are much smaller than the coecients from the OLS regressions. This implies that the UK manufacturing industry is characterised by both skill-biased technological change and ability-biased technological change.
The impact of patent applications on wages over time is slightly dierent to the impact of R&D expenditure. Equally is the development of the graduation variable, both when the interaction term between patent applications and higher education is not included and when it is included (Table 4 ). The patent coecients decrease continually between 1991 and 2006 but are still signicant in all periods. Only the patent coecient in the rst period is slightly smaller when the interaction term is included. This drop is balanced out by the coecient of the interaction term in the rst period. In both the RE and the HT models, more patent applications raise the wage for graduate workers signicantly. In the next period, the coecients are signicant, while they increase again from the second to the third period and are highest in the last period. This implies that the skill-bias has already been there with respect to patent applications, then seemingly disappeared and then appeared again and increased since about the year 2000. The result can also, but less strongly, and * * * denote signicance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 18 regional dummies, 9 occupational and 14 year dummies included. Charcatersitics inlcude prodiction output by industry, a female dummy, tenure tenure squared, two rmsize dummies, a dummy for union membership, a dummy for being married, having kids, self-rated healh and three age dummies.
be interpreted as skill-biased technological change in the UK manufacturing industry. Dierent to the R&D results, using patent applications nds no evidence for abilitybiased technological change. However, as mentioned earlier, measuring innovation output in terms of patent applications is a worse measure for innovative activity than R&D expenditure. Bartel and Sicherman (1999) also found stronger evidence of wage premia for higher educated workers when using innovation input-related factors compared to output-related factors.
Furthermore, xed eects regressions are estimated which eliminate the eect of unobserved eects correlated with education completely. However, as the obtained educational level is time-invariant, it drops out of the regression equation. Multiplying time period dummies allows looking at the change of the graduation premium over time. Table A5 presents the coecients of the graduation regressor. It shows that the graduation premium was not signicantly dierent in the second period compared to the rst period. In the third and the fourth period the premium is 10 and 12 percentage points higher than in the rst two periods. This validates the results that have been found using the other models. Table A6 shows the development of the personal innovation premium for graduate workers (interaction term) and on average. Similar to what has been seen before, the personal innovation premium for higher educated workers increases signicantly and the average innovation premium decreases over time. Hence, also the xed eects regression results support the skill-biased technological change hypothesis. They are not allow drawing conclusions about ability-biased technological change.
As further robustness checks, all models have been estimated including both R&D expenditure data and patent application data and their interaction terms simultaneously. The coecients do not change qualitatively and results do not lead to dierent conclusions than with estimating separate models. Furthermore, all models including 
Conclusion
A large strand of the literature has tried to shed light on the complex wage patterns and the increasing wage inequality between graduates and less educated workers in recent decades in the UK. Many authors have shown that wage inequality can partly be explained by industry and rm characteristics, especially by innovative activity and technological change (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Autor et al., 1998; Haskel and Slaughter, 2002; Levy and Murnane, 2006; Bartel and Sicherman, 1999) . As most studies focus on the U.S., this paper concentrates on the UK. It contributes to the existing literature in many ways. First, it extends the study by Bartel and Sicherman (1999) , who investigated the`technological change premium' in the U.S., in at least two respects. One is the use of additional panel data estimation methods namely Mundlak and Hausman-Taylor models, which allow controlling for both individual and industry-specic ability and reduces biases in the estimated premia. The other is the inclusion of time variables to the model, making it possible to investigate changes over time and hence, to identify SBTC explicitly. Second, a new aspect of this study is that it indirectly tests the ABTC hypothesis modelled by Galor and Moav (2000) empirically, which has not been done so far. Furthermore, the study can shed some light on the complicated relationship between technological change and the demand for university graduates in times when the share of university graduates has almost doubled within 20 years and reached more than 50% in 2006. This implies an ability-bias in the estimation of the personal innovation premium for graduates. Including time period dummies in the regressions allows for looking at the development of the premia over time. As the innovation premium for graduates increased signicantly over time by up to 25 percentage points, while it does not for less educated workers, the results provide evidence for skill-biased technological change. Using R&D expenditure as a measure for innovative activity additionally provides evidence for ability-biased technological change, while patent applications are not supporting this hypothesis. This is evidence that there is indeed a hidden increase in wage inequality which cannot be detected at an aggregate level.
The ndings have important implications for the future development of wage inequality in the UK. One is that wage inequality between high-and low-educated workers will increase given that demand for graduates in innovative industries increases, i.e. if SBTC continues. The other implication is that wage inequality within the group of high-educated workers will further increase if the number of graduates further increases. It can easily be concluded that those graduates with the highest ability have sorted into jobs which are associated with a high rate of innovative activity. The results also relate to the ndings about over-education among graduates in the UK (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Chevalier, 2000; Chevalier and Lindley, 2009 ).
An increase in the number of graduates has been an explicit policy goal by the British government. By 2010 it wanted to raise the share of university educated to 50% which has been achieved. However, this has led to a new policy debate about tuition fees in 2010. To be able to nance higher education, the current coalition government has proposed to raise the limit for tuition fees from 3,290 GBP to 9,000 GBP from 2012 (The Economist, 2010) . Given that the expansion of the higher education system in the last decades has disproportionally beneted people from richer family backgrounds than those from poorer family backgrounds (Blanden and Machin, 2004) , perspectives for people from poorer families decrease. The gain from technological change will also in future be reserved for rich people, boosting their wealth and accelerating economic and social inequality.
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